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1 Introduction 
China’s integration into the world economy has been marked by vigorous export promotion 
combined with a steadfast commitment to protecting its domestic market. The dual nature of 
China’s trade policy regime in which export-oriented firms coexist alongside highly protected 
state-owned enterprises, has been aptly described by Feenstra (1998) as “one country, two 
systems.” A crucial element of China’s export promotion strategy has been the use of 
subsidies with export share requirements (ESR). These encompass a wide range of fiscal 
advantages such as tax deductions, access to soft loans, duty-free imports of intermediate 
and capital goods and priority access to infrastructure and land, accruing to firms conditional 
on their export intensity (i.e. the share of total sales accounted for by exports) exceeding a 
given threshold.
1 
Quite often firms are required to export all their output to benefit from the 
subsidies. 
Although it is not possible to directly observe if a firm receives subsidies with ESR, it is 
possible to identify firms that are likely to benefit from these subsidies based on their observed 
export intensity. Thus, Defever and Ria˜no (2014) back out the unobserved subsidies following 
a calibration strategy which utilizes data on the overall export intensity distribution of a country 
and the productivity premia estimated for exporters identified as enjoying subsidies 
✝University of Nottingham, GEP, CESifo and CEP/LSE. fabrice.defever@nottingham.ac.uk 
University of Nottingham, GEP, CFCM and CESifo. alejandro.riano@nottingham.ac.uk 
'Defever and Riaño (2014) provide a detailed description of subsidies featuring export share requirements 
available in China between 2000 and 2006. 
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Figure 1: Export Intensity Distribution of Exporters in China 
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with ESR relative to exporters that do not benefit 
from this policy and domestic firms.
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The World Bank’s Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS) reveals that the share of 
exporters selling all their output abroad, which we 
denote ‘pure exporters’, experienced a dramatic fall 
from 25.7% to 11.1% of exporting firms between 2002 and 2013 (see Figure 1). This pattern is 
consistent with a reduction in subsidies with ESR by the Chinese government in response to 
greater international scrutiny of its trade policies. 
In this paper, we gauge the change in subsidies with ESR which is consistent with the 
decline in the share of pure exporters observed in China over the last decade. To do so, we 
consider a simplified version of the model proposed by Defever and Ria˜no (2014), featuring 
a single ad-valorem sales subsidy associated with a 100% export share requirement. The 
parameters of the general equilibrium model are calibrated using Chinese firm-level data 
2The main identifying assumption is that high export intensity exporters arise because of the use of subsidies 
with ESR by the Chinese Government. Defever and Riaño (2014) show that these subsidies target primarily 
three types of firms, foreign-invested enterprises, export processing establishments and firms located in Free 
Trade Zones, and that the vast majority of high-intensity exporters belong to one of these groups. 
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from the 2002 wave of BEEPS. We use the model to quantify the effect of a reduction in 
subsidies with ESR on the total expenditure on subsidies, aggregate exports and welfare for 
China and the rest of the world. Our results provide a first assessment of the extent to which 
China has reformed its dual export system over the last decade. 
Despite undertaking wide-reaching trade liberalization reforms such as expanding trading 
rights, lowering import tariffs and eliminating non-tariff barriers in anticipation to joining the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the use of export subsidies in China, and those 
featuring export requirements in particular, was hardly curbed during this wave of reforms. 
This course of action has proven to be highly controversial. Under the terms of its accession 
protocol, China was required to notify the WTO of any export subsidies in place ahead of the 
annual Transitional Review Mechanism, the procedure monitoring China’s compliance with 
its WTO commitments. However, despite its commitment, China only submitted two subsidy 
notifications in 2006 and 2011. Both of these were deemed to be highly incomplete because 
they did not disclose the level of expenditure of a large number of subsidy programs listed in 
each notification. Additionally, subsidies granted at the sub-national, provincial and local 
level, which are widely considered to be important instruments of export promotion, were 
excluded from both notifications.
3
 
After 2006, the US, EU and other WTO member countries have actively challenged Chi-
nese subsidies with ESR. This pressure in turn has led to the gradual dismantlement of several 
subsidy programmes. For instance, the corporate income tax deduction available to export -
oriented foreign-invested enterprises was terminated in 2008. Similarly, the preferential 
treatment for domestically-owned firms located in Special Economic Zones and exporting 
more than 70% of their output was also terminated in 2008. In both cases, a five-year tran-
sition period was established so that the new tax legislation became operational in 2012. At 
the same time, several financial incentives conditional on a firm’s export intensity still remain 
in place, and even new ones have been introduced over the last decade. For instance,  
3See “Request from the United States to China,” October 11, 2011, reference G/SCM/Q2/CHN/42.  
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the first pilot “Export Processing Zones” which were established in 2000 and feature strict 
limitations on firms’ domestic sales, have tripled in number by 2010. Similarly, the “Famous 
Brands” initiative, a large umbrella of export support programs which included subsidies 
contingent on export performance, was introduced in 2005 and was only abandoned in 2009 
after being challenged by the US and the EU at the WTO the year before. The “Auto Export 
Base” program introduced in 2009, was also challenged in 2012 by the Obama Ad -
ministration during the 2012 presidential election. These examples illustrate how difficult it 
is to evaluate the extent to which the dual trade policy regime in China has been reformed.  
Our results show that a reduction of 6.9% in the ad-valorem sales subsidy rate offered to 
pure exporters (from 30 to 27.53%) suffices to replicate the observed decline in their share 
among exporting firms. This small reduction, however, produces a significant fall in the total 
expenditure in export subsidies over GDP from 1.23% in 2002 to 0.42% in 2013, a reduction 
of 66%. As the distortions generated by the subsidy are lessened, China’s terms-of-trade 
improve and the average productivity of Chinese firms increases as well due to stronger 
import competition. Both effects increase welfare (measured as real income) in China by 
1.76%. Conversely, the rest of the world experiences a welfare loss of 0.59% due to the higher 
price of Chinese imports. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces a 100%-ESR subsidy in a simple 
partial equilibrium model of trade with heterogeneous firms. We characterize the conditions 
under which pure exporters arise and coexist in equilibrium with domestic firms and firms 
serving both domestic and foreign markets, which we denote ‘regular exporters’. Section 3 
briefly describes how a general equilibrium version of the model in Section 2 is calibrated, 
matching moments calculated using firm-level data from the 2002-2003 wave of BEEPS. Finally, 
Section 4 analyzes how a fall in subsidies consistent with the reduction in the share of pure 
exporters observed between 2002 and 2013 affects total expenditure in subsidies, aggregate 
exports and welfare in China and the rest of the world. 
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2  M o d e l  
Assume that Chinese firms can sell their output in China (c) and the rest of the World (f). 
The demand function faced by a firm producing variety ϕ selling in market i is: 
qi(ϕ) = Aipi(ϕ)-a, i c {c, f}, (1) 
where pi(ϕ) is the price of good ϕ charged in market i, Ai is a country-specific demand shifter 
and σ is the elasticity of demand. Each variety is produced by a monopolistically-competitive 
firm with technology q = ϕl, where l denotes labor input and ϕ is a firm-specific productivity 
index. 
A Chinese firm can choose between three potential modes of operation: (i) produce for 
the domestic market alone, which entails paying a fixed cost fd, (ii) become a regular exporter 
selling both domestically and abroad, by paying a fixed cost of exporting fx in addition to the 
fixed cost of operating in the domestic market or (iii) become a pure exporter, i.e. a firm that 
exports all its output because it faces a 100% export share requirement.
4
 The latter option 
requires the firm to pay a fixed cost fx and enables it to receive an ad-valorem subsidy s on 
its sales. 
Let k c {d, x, p} index the three possible modes of production: domestic, regular and 
pure exporter respectively. The profit that a firm of productivity ϕ attains in operation 
mode k is: 
πk(ϕ, s) = 
✫
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
κAc(ϕ)
a-1 — fd, if k = d, 
κ[Ac + τ
1-aAf](ϕ)a-1 — (fd + fx), if k = x, 
κ(1 + s)aτ1-aAf(ϕ)a-1 — fx, if k = p, 
(2) 
where κ = (σ — 1)a-1σ-a and the wage in China has been normalized to 1. Both regular and 
pure exporters face an iceberg transport cost τ 1 when selling their output abroad. 
4Defever and Ria˜no (2014) study the general case in which export share requirements can take an 
arbitrary value. 
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A Chinese firm with productivity ϕ chooses to operate under the pure exporter mode k  p 
if πp♣ϕ, sq ➙ maxtπd♣ϕq, πx♣ϕq, 0, or equivalently if πp♣ϕ, sq ➙ πd♣ϕq, πp♣ϕ, sq ➙ 
πx♣ϕq and πp♣ϕ, sq ➙ 0 hold together. We characterize this set of conditions by defining four 
different productivity cutoffs that describe combinations of productivity and subsidy rates ♣ϕ, sq 
for which a firm is indifferent between a given pair of production modes. 
We start with the two standard cutoffs ϕ* and ϕ*x that identify domestic firms and regular 
exporters in the Melitz (2003) model in the absence of pure exporters, 
ϕ *    f d     
κAc 
ϕ x    τ( f *Ax   
\ κrlf 
These two cutoffs are respectively, the 
productivity level above which a Chinese firm would find it profitable to produce for the 
domestic market alone tϕ : πd♣ϕ*q  0, and the productivity level necessary for a firm to 
choose to become a regular exporter tϕ : πx♣ϕ*xq  0. We assume that in the absence of 
subsidies, exporters are more productive than domestic firms in China, i.e. we assume that 
fdfx ↕ Ac♣τ
1-σAfq, which implies ϕ* ↕ ϕ*x. 
We define two additional cutoffs that arise in the presence of a pure exporters. Let ϕ♣sq be 
the productivity level at which a firm would be indifferent between being a regular or a pure 
exporter, i. e. ϕ♣sq  tϕ : πp♣ϕ, sq  πc♣ϕq. Thus, ϕ♣sq is 
given by, 
ϕ♣sq  fd
  
κ♣Ac  τ
1-σAfr♣1 + sqσ  1sq 
Inspection of (5) reveals that ϕ♣sq is strictly increasing in s, with ϕ♣0q  ϕ* and ϕ♣smax 
1  q Ñ 
✽ ,  with smax 
1 defined below. In order for a firm to choose to operate as a pure rather than a regular 
exporter, it must be the case that the subsidy it receives is greater than the profits it could earn in 
the domestic market. Thus, high productivity firms require high subsidy rates to be swayed 6 
1   
σ
-
1  
, (3) 
1  
σ
-
1  
. (4) 
1  
σ
-
1  
. (5) 
 
towards operating as pure exporters. 
 Figure 2: Choice of Mode of Operation with Pure Exporters 
Similarly, let ϕ(s) be the productivity level such that a firm would be indifferent between 
selling only in the domestic market and operating as a pure exporter. That is, ϕ(s) is defined 
implicitly by ϕ(s) = {ϕ : πp(ϕ, s) = πd(ϕ)}. This condition reads: 
ϕ ( s )  =  f x  —  f d   
 
κ(τ1σAf(1 + s)σ — Ac) 
Under the additional assumption that fx > fd, it follows that ϕ(s) 
is strictly decreasing in s whenever s > smin, with smin defined below. Firms with productivity ϕ c 
(ϕ✝,ϕ✝x) which would prefer to operate domestically in the absence of subsidies, find it profitable 
to change their production mode if the additional revenue they receive because of the subsidy is 
greater than the difference in fixed costs, fx — fd. Therefore, domestic firms with relatively high 
productivity levels would require a lower subsidy to become pure exporters. Figure 2 plots all the 
different cutoffs in {ϕ, s}-space. 
Comparing all four cutoffs (3)-(6), it follows that pure exporters arise when s is such 
that ϕ(s) ϕ(s). The minimum subsidy necessary for firms to choose the pure exporter 
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operation mode, smin, is given by, 
 
Figure 2 also shows that ϕ♣sminq  ϕ♣sminq  ϕ*x. Therefore, when s ➙ smin, pure exporters start to 
arise around the no-subsidy export cutoff, ϕ*x. This implies that pure exporters are more 
productive than domestic firms, but less so than regular exporters.
5
 
As s increases, the share of active firms operating as pure exporters increases at the 
expense of domestic firms and regular exporters. In fact, if s is sufficiently high, either 
domestic firms or regular exporters would disappear. As noted above, let smax 
1  be the value 
of subsidy for which ϕ♣sq Ñ ✽, that is, 
 
meaning that no firm would find it profitable to operate as a regular exporter. If on the other 
hand, it is the case that a very large subsidy stops firms from producing uniquely for the domestic 
market, we can define smax2 as the subsidy value for which ϕ♣s
max
2 q  ϕ*, i.e. 
 
Proposition 1 summarizes the conditions under which the three modes of production arise in 
equilibrium. 
Proposition 1 Assume that fdfx ↕  Ac♣τ1—σA fq and fd   fx, the three modes of pro- 
5Defever and Ria
˜
no (2014) show that this prediction requires that the effective fixed cost of operation of 
pure exporters to be higher than that of domestic firms. If the converse is true, for instance if pure exporters 
also receive subsidies affecting their fixed cost (e.g. reduced land rental rates or public utilities), then firms 
choosing to operate as pure exporters would be less productive than domestic firms. Empirically,  Defever 
and Ria
˜
no (2014) find that pure exporters in China are indeed more productive than domestic firms and less 
productive than regular exporters. The latter prediction of the model should hold regardless of the whether 
the subsidy is applied to sales or fixed costs as long as domestic firms coexist alongside pure and regular 
exporters in equilibrium. 
 
smin (1 + 
Ac  fd 
τ1—σAf fx ) 
1  
σ  
 1 → 0. (7) 
 
 
1 ✑(1 ~ Ac ) 
smax 
τ1—σAf 
1  
σ  
 1, (8) 
 
 
smax (fx Ac  
-2 fd τ1—σAf 
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σ  
 1. (9) 
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duction k E {d,p,x} coexist in the presence of a positive and sufficiently large subsidy s, such that s E 
(smin,min{six,r2n 
s
ax
l). Firms with productivity ϕ E [ϕ*,c,a(s)) only operate 
domestically, firms with productivity levels ϕ E kϕ(s),ϕ(s)) choose to operate as pure 
exporters, and firms with ϕ ϕ(s) self-select into regular exporters.  
3  G e n e r a l  E q u i l i b r i u m  a n d  C a l i b r a t i o n  
We follow Defever and Ria˜no (2014) and introduce subsidies with ESR in an otherwise standard 
two-country, general equilibrium of trade with heterogenous firms as in Melitz (2003). We 
assume that only one country (i.e. China) uses these subsidies. 
There are two countries in the world, China (c) and the rest of the World (f), each of size Li, i 
E {c, fl. Consumers in each country have CES preferences that yield demand functions like (1), 
with Ai = EiP σ1 
i , where Ei denotes country i’s total expenditure and Pi is the ideal 
price index in the same country. Labor is the only input of production; there is a mass of 
potential entrants who draw their idiosyncratic productivity from a Pareto distribution 
G(ϕ) = 1 — ϕ
a
 after paying a sunk cost fe.
6
 The problem for Chinese firms is identical to 
the one described in Section 2, while producers in the rest of the world cannot operate as 
pure exporters. 
Equilibrium in the model is characterized by a vector of wages, mass of active firms and 
price indices such that in both countries the labor market clears, there is free entry, and 
aggregate income equals aggregate expenditure (i.e. trade is balanced). Subsidies with ESR in 
China are financed via lump-sum taxes levied on households and the government’s budget is 
balanced. 
Both countries are assumed to be identical in terms of size and the vector of parameters faced 
by firms and consumers. We calibrate the model following a similar strategy as Defever and 
Ria˜no (2014). Table 1 presents the parameters used to solve the model. 
6All fixed costs are denominated in units of labor. 
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Table 1: Simulation Parameters 
Parameter Description Value 
Li Country i’s size, i {c, f 1.00 
σ Elasticity of substitution 3.00 
fe Entry cost 1.00 
a Pareto distribution shape parameter 2.76 
fd Fixed cost of operating in the domestic market 0.46 
fx Fixed cost of exporting 0.71 
r Iceberg transportation cost 1.29 
s 100%-ESR subsidy 0.30 
The parameters ♣fd, fx, r, s) are chosen to match four moments: (i) the shares (among all 
active firms) of regular (ii) and pure exporters (i.e. firms exporting more than 97% of their 
sales) of 26 and 9% respectively, (iii) an export/sales ratio for regular exporters of 36.1%, and a 
(iv) productivity premium of pure exporters vis-à-vis domestic firms of 37.6%. The first three 
moments are calculated using data from the BEEPS dataset for the year 2002; the total factor 
productivity premium is for the year 2002 and is estimated using the Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) algorithm with data for the period 2000-2006 from the annual survey of Chinese 
manufacturing firms compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The magnitude of 
the calibrated transport cost and the fixed cost of exporting (relative to the domestic fixed 
cost) are within the range of estimates reported in the literature. More importantly, a 30% ad-
valorem sales subsidy with a 100% ESR is required to match the share of pure exporters 
operating in China in 2002. The calibrated subsidy is slightly smaller than the 33.2% inferred in 
the richer model used in Defever and Ria˜no (2014), which features multiple export share 
requirements, not only a 100% one as in the current exercise; total expenditure on pure 
exporter subsidies accounts for 1.23% of GDP in the benchmark model. 
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4 Decreasing Subsidies with ESR 
We use the calibrated model to infer the reduction in subsidies with ESR that is consistent 
with the share of pure exporters declining from 25.7% of all exporters in 2002-2003 to 11.1% 
in 2012-2013 in the BEEPS data. We then evaluate how the fall in subsidies with ESR 
affected total expenditure in subsidies, exports and welfare both in China and in the rest of 
the world (ROW). The results of this experiment are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2: Fall in the Share of Pure Exporters (among exporting firms) from 25.7% to 11.1% 
 
Variable 2002 2013 % Change 
100%-ESR subsidy rate 30.00% 27.53% -6.90 
Subsidies/GDP, China 1.23% 0.42% -65.85 
Exports/GDP, China 30.93% 29.97% -3.10 
Welfare, China   1.76 
Welfare, ROW   -0.59 
 
A reduction in the 100%-ESR subsidy rate from 30 to 27.53% matches the reduction in the 
share of pure exporters among exporting firms in China. As shown in Figure 2, the share of pure 
exporters is highly responsive to changes in the subsidy rate. Similarly, total expenditure in 
export subsidies falls by a staggering 65%. 
Reducing subsidies with ESR improves China’s welfare, measured as real disposable in-
come, by 1.76%. The tax burden on Chinese consumers is lessened, and they are now able to 
enjoy a greater variety of goods which were previously produced in China but were only 
available to foreign consumers (a ‘love-of-variety’ effect increases welfare directly). Moreover, 
because of tougher domestic competition, the price index in China also falls. Welfare for ROW 
falls as its imports become more expensive, experiencing a terms-of-trade loss. 
11 
5 Conclusion 
The results of our exercise suggest that indeed China has gradually diminish the degree of 
dualism in its trade policy regime over the last decade. Phasing out the advantages granted to 
export-oriented firms has reduced the tax burden on consumers, improved terms-of-trade and 
produced sizable welfare gains. However, there is still scope for further reform. Our simple 
model suggests that China would stand to realize an additional 1 percent increase in real income 
if it were to fully eliminate subsidies with export share requirements. 
References 
DEFEVER, F. AND A. RIA
˜
No (2014): “Protectionism Through Exporting: Subsidies with Export 
Share Requirements in China,” Manuscript, University of Nottingham. 
FEENSTRA, R. C. (1998): “One Country, Two Systems: Implications of WTO Entry for China,” 
Manuscript, University of California, Davis. 
LEVINSoHN, J. AND A. PETRIN (2003): “Estimating Production Functions Using Inputs to Control 
for Unobservables,” Review of Economic Studies, 70, 317–341. 
MELITZ, M. J. (2003): “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate 
Productivity,” Econometrica, 71, 1695–1725. 
12 
